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RETENTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
DATA: A BUMPY ROAD AHEAD
ABU BAKAR MUNIRt
SIWi HAJAR MOHD YASINtt
I.

INTRODUCTION

The EU Electronic Privacy Directive 20021 requires Member States
to ensure the confidentiality of communications. In particular, Member
States shall prohibit listening, taping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications. 2 The communications service
providers are obligated to delete all traffic data no longer required for the
provision of a communications service. 3 Yet, Member States are permitted to restrict the scope of this protection to safeguard national security,
defense, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and
4
prosecution of criminal offences.
Despite strong criticism by privacy experts, data protection commissioners, civil liberties groups and the ISP industry, a provision on the
retention of communications data was inserted. This new Directive
reverses the position under the 1997 Telecommunications Privacy Directive by explicitly allowing the EU countries to compel Internet Service
Providers and telecommunications companies to record, index and store
their subscribers' communications data.5 Under the terms of the new Directive, Member States may now pass laws mandating the retention of
traffic and location data of all communications taking place over mobile
phones, SMS, landline telephones, faxes, e-mails, chat rooms, the Internet, or any other electronic communication device. 6 Article 15 of the
t
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1. Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002/58/EC (July 12, 2002)
(concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the Electronic
communication sector) (available in LEXIS at 2002 OJ L 201).
2. Id. at art. 5.
3. Id. at art. 6.
4. Id. at art. 15(1).
5. Directive 97/66/EC (repealed).
6. Supra n. 4.
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Directive provides that Member States may adopt legislative measures
when such restrictions constitute a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society. 7 Specifically, Member
States may adopt legislative measures providing for the retention of data
for a limited period. 8
The EU countries were given until October 31, 2003 to implement
Directive.
Thus, it is topical and interesting to make an assessment
the
on the implementation of one of the most controversial and much debated subjects of the Directive - the retention of communications data. In
doing so, perhaps it is logical to focus on the position in the UK, being the
only country that has a comprehensive legislation on this matter, so far.
This paper traces the origin of the new Directive. It lays down the UK's
legal frameworks concerning retention of communications data. Criticism on the data retention and UK's legal regime is given considerable
attention. In closing, the paper examines the need to strike the right balance between fighting crime and terrorism and protecting the fundamental rights of the individual.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE

In 1997, the European Union supplemented its 1995 Data Protection
Directive by introducing the Telecommunications Privacy Directive. This
Directive established specific protections covering telephone, digital television, mobile networks and other telecommunications systems. It imposed wide-ranging obligations on carriers and service providers to
ensure the privacy of users' communications, including Internet-related
activities. 9 It covered areas that, until then, had fallen between the
cracks of data protection laws. Access to billing data was severely restricted, as was marketing activity. Caller ID technology was required to
incorporate an option for per-line blocking of number transmission. Information collected in the delivery of a communication was required to be
purged once the call was completed. 10
In July 2000, the European Commission issued a proposal for a new
directive on privacy in the electronic communications sector. The proposal was introduced as a part of a larger package of the telecommunications directives aimed at strengthening competition within the European
electronic communications markets. As originally proposed, the new directive would have strengthened privacy rights for individuals by ex7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments 11 (EPIC: US 2002).
10. Id.
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tending the protections that were already in place for
telecommunications to a broader, more technology-neutral category of
'electronic communications." ' During the process, however, the Council
of Ministers began to push for the inclusion of data retention provisions,
requiring the Internet Service Providers and telecommunications operators to store logs of all telephone calls, e-mails, faxes and Internet activity for law enforcement purposes. These proposals were strongly opposed
by most members of the Parliament. In July 2001, the European Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee approved the draft directive without
data retention, stating:
The Civil Liberties Committee ('LIBE Committee') expressed itself in
favor of a strict regulation of law enforcement authorities' access to personal data of citizens, such as communication traffic and location data.
This decision is fundamental because in this way the EP blocks European Union States' efforts underway in the Council to put their citizens
under generalized and pervasive surveillance, following the Echelon
model.12
The events of September 11, however, have changed the political climate. The Parliament came under increasing pressure from the Member
States to adopt the Council's proposal for data retention. The United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, in particular, questioned whether the
privacy policy rules still struck 'the right balance between privacy and
the needs of the law enforcement agencies in the light of the battle
against terrorism.' The Parliament stood firm and up to a few weeks
before the final vote on May 30, 2002, the majority of MEPs opposed any
form of data retention. Finally, after much pressure by the European
Council and European Union governments, and well-organized lobbying
by two Spanish MEPs, the two main political parties (PPE and PSE, the
centre-left and centre-right parties) reached a deal to vote in favor of the
13
Council's position.
The initiatives, in fact, began immediately after September 11. On
September 20, 2001, the European Commission requested the Council of
the European Union to submit proposals "for ensuring that law enforcement authorities are able to investigate criminal acts involving the use of
electronic communications systems and to take legal measures against
their perpetrators."' 4 At a specially called meeting of the EU's Justice
and Home Affairs, the Council adopted a series of 'Conclusions' which
included requiring service providers to retain traffic data (instead of del1. Id.
12. Id.

13. Id. at 12.
14. Statewatch News Online, EU Governments Want the Retention of all Telecommunications Data for General Use by Law Enforcement Agencies Under Terrorism Plan, http://

www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/20authoritarian.htm (accessed July 28, 2004).
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stroying it) and for legal enforcement authorities to have access to it "for
the purposes of criminal investigations." 15 Only two weeks before this
request, on September 6, 2001, the European Parliament recommended
in a resolution that "a general data retention principle must be forbidden" and that "any general obligation concerning data retention" is con16
trary to the proportionality principle.
The external pressure from the United States came in the form of
forty demands on the EU. In a letter dated October 16, 2001 to the President of the European Commission, President Bush requested that the
European Union consider data protection issues in the context of law enforcement and counter-terrorism imperatives and, as a result, to revise
draft privacy directives that call for mandatory destruction to permit the
retention of critical data for a reasonable period. Simply, the demand
was that the draft privacy directives that call for mandatory destruction
should be revised to permit the retention of critical data for a reasonable
17
period.
Understandably, the group of eight Justices and Interior Ministers
(G8), in May 2002, made similar requests:
States should examine their policies concerning the availability of traffic data and subscriber information so that a balance is struck between
the protection of privacy, industry's considerations and law enforcement's fulfillment of the public safety mandate. Data protection policies
should strike a balance between the protections of personal data, industry's considerations such as network security and fraud prevention, and
law enforcement's needs to conduct investigations to combat crime and
18
terrorist activities.
A policy document from the G8 states,
To the extent that data protection legislation continues to permit the
retention of data only for billing purposes, such a position would overlook crucial legitimate societal interests - particularly when applied to
the Internet service provider area, where flat rate pricing and free Internet and E-mail services foreclose the need to retain traffic data for
15. See Statewatch News Online, Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and
Home Affairs), 3, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/03926-r6.pdf (accessed July 28,
2004).
16. Clive Walker & Yaman Akdeniz, Anti-terrorism Laws and Data retention: War is
Over?, 54 N. Ireland Leg. Q. [No.2] (citing 167 Extraordinary Council meeting, Justice,
Home Affairs and Civil Protection, Brussels (Sept. 20, 2001)).
17. There is no similar obligation for the general retention of data in the U.S. even
after the passing of the U.S.A. PatriotAct. When debating the passage of the Act, the U.S.
Congress repeatedly rejected a full data retention approach.
18. Department of Justice Canada, G8 Statement: Principles on the Availability of
DataEssential to ProtectingPublic Safety, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/g8/doc3.html
(Feb. 5, 2004).
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billing purposes - and thereby seriously hamper public safety.' 9
It has been argued that while the European Parliament was still "discussing the changes to the 1997 EC Directive on Privacy in Telecommunications, the Belgian government was drafting (and circulating for
comment) a binding Framework Decision on the retention of traffic data
20
According to the
and access for the law enforcement agencies."
Statewatch, the document "shows that the EU governments always intended to introduce an EC law to bind all member states to adopt data
21
retention."
In June 2001, "the incoming Danish Presidency of the Council of the
European Union (the 15 EU governments) submitted 'Draft Council conclusions' on this topic, which [contained] four recommendations to the
EU's Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime (MDG)." 2 2 The Draft
Conclusions state:
Within the very near future, binding rules should be established on the
approximation of member States' rule on the obligation of telecommunications service providers to keep information concerning telecommuniis available when it is
cations in order to ensure that such information
23
of significance for a criminal investigation.
One of the arguments put forward in legitimizing "the move during the
discussions in the European Parliament was that the change to the 1997
Directive simply enabled governments to adopt laws for data retention if
national parliaments agreed."2 4 "The draft Framework Decision [states]
that data should be retained for twelve to twenty-four months in order
25
for law enforcement agencies to have access to it."
III.

THE UK'S DATA RETENTION REGIME

The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 ("ATCSA"), in
Part 11, is specifically dedicated to the retention of communications
data. 26 Sections 102-107 give power to the Secretary of State to ensure
19. Department of Justice Canada, G8 Statement on Data Protection Regimes, http:ll

canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/g8/doc5.html (Feb. 2, 2004).
20. A copy of which has been leaked to Statewatch, Statewatch. Statewatch Analysis
no. 11, Surveillance of Communications: Data Retention to be Compulsory for 12-24

months, 1, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/auglanalyll.pdf (accessed Oct. 25, 2004)
(analyzing the draft framework decision).
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Statewatch. Statewatch Analysis no. 11, Surveillance of Communications: Data
Retention to be Compulsoryfor 12-24 months, 2, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/aug/

analyl.pdf (accessed Oct. 25, 2004).
26. See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act §§ 102-107 (2001) [hereinafter ATCSA].
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that communications providers retain data. 27 Section 102(1) provides
that "the Secretary of State shall issue, and may from time to time revise, a code of practice relating to the retention by communications providers of communications data obtained by or held by them." 28 Under
subsection (2), "the Secretary of State may enter into such agreements as
he considers appropriate with any communications provider about the
practice to be followed by that provider in relation to the retention of
29
communications data obtained by or held by that provider."
Any code of practice or agreement may contain provisions that appears to the Secretary of State to be necessary "(a) 'for the purpose of
safeguarding national security;' or '(b) for the purposes of prevention or
detection of crime or the prosecution of offenders which may relate directly or indirectly to national security."30 This phrase 'may relate directly or indirectly to national security' was included apparently as a last
minute opposition amendment in the House of Lords to act as a limitation of the purposes envisaged. Whatever is intended, there may only be
limited practical difference - the agreement or code of practice seems
likely to require communication providers to retain all information they
have of certain types for a period of time, and it would be probably not be
practical to retain data selected on a message-by-message basis. It seems
unlikely that in most circumstances it would be possible to distinguish
between that data which is so potentially relevant to national security
and that which is not, so the requirement in practice may be to retain it
31
all.
The procedure for making the code of conduct of practice is governed
by Section 103. The Secretary of State is required to publish the code in
draft and to consider any recommendations about the draft. 32 He is specifically required to consult with the Information Commissioner and with
communication service providers to whom the code will apply. 33 He is
then to lay the draft code before Parliament. 34 The code is to be brought
into force by statutory instrument, which is to be approved by Parlia35
ment under the affirmative resolution procedure.
27. Id.
28. Id. at § 102(1).
29. Id. at § 102(2).
30. Id. at § 102(3).
31. Philip Westmacott, Computer Law and Security Report: Big Brother Never Forgets
- The Data Retention Provisionsof the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, vol. 18,
no. 3, 206 (2002).
32. ATCSA § 103(1).
33. Id. at § 103(2).
34. Id. § 103(4).
35. Id. § 103(5), (7).
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Failure to comply with the code of practice or agreement shall not in
and of itself render the communications service providers liable for any
criminal or civil proceedings. 36 However, "a code of practice or agreement shall be admissible in evidence in any legal proceedings in which
the question arises [as to] whether [ I the retention of any communications data is justified on the grounds that a failure to retain the data
would be likely to prejudice national security, the prevention or detection
of crime or the prosecution of offenders." 37 This subsection provides a
basis of admissibility of a voluntary code of practice or agreement to protect any communications provider in the event that the retention of data
is sought to be justified on the grounds of national security or crime prevention, detection or prosecution on the basis of national security.
In the event that voluntary scheme fails, section 104 of the ATCSA
empowers the Secretary of State to issue a direction. 38 Under this section, the Secretary of State may issue a direction by order made by statutory instrument, specifying the maximum period that communications
service providers may be required to retain data.3 9 The power to issue
such an order is only to be exercised if, after reviewing the operation of
any Code or agreement under section 102, the Secretary of State considers it to be necessary to do so. 4 0 Such an order may only be made for the
statutory purposes prescribed in section 102(3).41 Accordingly, the legislation envisages that the Secretary of State must first seek to achieve a
workable system of voluntary data retention for national security purposes and only if that fails adequately to meet those objectives may he
resort to compulsory powers. As with the Code, there are statutory con42
sultation requirements, but these do not include the Commissioner.
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ("RIPA") "permits
a range of public authorities to obtain access to such communications
data for a wide variety of public interest purposes beyond issues concerning national security."4 3 The ATCSA provides for the retention of data
for the purposes of safeguarding national security or for the prevention
or detection of crime or the prosecution of offences, which relates directly
or indirectly to national security. Ben Emmerson QC and Helen
Mountfield wrote:
36. Id. § 102(4).
37. ATCSA § 102(5).
38. Id. at § 104.
39. Id. at § 104(1).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See ATCSA § 104(4).
43. Ben Emmerson QC & Helen Mountfield, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001: Retention and Disclosure of Communications Data: Summary of Councils' Advice, T
4, http://www.privacyinternational.orglcountries/uk/surveillance/ic-terror-opinion.htm (accessed Apr. 30, 2004).
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The consequence of these two overlapping regimes is that data may be
retained for longer than they otherwise would be, on the ground that
their retention is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding national
security, but that the data may then be accessed for a variety of collateral public purposes which have no connection (direct or indirect) with
national security.4 4
Caspar Bowden of the Foundation for Information Policy Research
("FIPR") noted that Part 11 of the ATCSA would "allow automated surveillance of the private lives of a substantial proportion of the population
through analyzing the patterns of their electronic communications. The
powers are deliberately broad and can be exercised quite generally for
non-terrorist, as well as terrorist, investigations." 4 5 He further noted
that, in short, it permits:
" Traffic Analysis - computerized 'trawling' of who people talk to (by
phone or e-mail), where they go (pinpoint tracking via mobile
phones), what they read (websites browsed).
" Blanket data retention - Internet and telephone companies will be
required to stockpile such data on the entire population for long periods-the penultimate step towards a national 'traffic data warehouse,'
sought jointly by police, customs, intelligence and security agencies.
" Mass-surveillance - a police Superintendent or equivalent rank can
authorize access to data on a single person or millions of people, without any judicial or executive warrant, and with no guidance on proportionality. Data thus obtained can be accumulated centrally and
exploited speculatively.
" Public order, minor offences, health and safety, and tax - are valid
purposes for the exercise of these powers, as well as counter46
terrorism.
IV.

CONSULTATION PAPER AND RESPONSE

On March 11, 2003, the Government published a consultation paper
on the Code of Practicefor Voluntary Retention of Communications Data
required under ATCSA. 4 7 Together with this, a draft Code of Practice
was attached in Annex A. 4 8 The paper invites views and comments on
the Code of Practice on "whether the approach being taken is appropriate and proportionate . . .whether the retention regime is appropriate
44. Id.

5.

45. Casper Bowden, Closed Circuit Television For Inside Your Head: Blanket Traffic
Data Retention and the Emergency Anti-terrorism Legislation, 2002 Duke L. & Tech. Rev.

0005,

1 (Apr. 5, 2002) http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0005.html.

46. Id.
47. U.K. Home Office, ConsultationPaper on a Code of Practicefor Voluntary Reten-

tion of Communications Data, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/vol-retention.pdf (Mar.
2003).
48. Id. at 17-25.
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under the data protection [regime]," the effects of compliance with the
Code on the industry, "whether the likely [expenditures] to comply with
the Code . . .is justified by the end product of such retention," and finally, and interestingly, whether the UK "should adopt new legislation
on data retention that removes the question of disparity that currently
49
exists."
The Home Office does not seem to be keen on data preservation as
suggested by many. It does not consider data preservation on a case-bycase basis to be an adequate tool for fighting terrorism and safeguarding
national security because "data preservation will never aid in the investigation of a person who is not currently suspected of involvement with a
terrorist organization." 50 The Government argues that "data preservation is a very useful tool for investigating the activities of someone already under suspicion." 5 1 The attitude is "data preservation can be used
52
to supplement data retention but not replace it."
According to the consultation paper, the "Code of Practice is intended to outline how communication service providers can assist in the
fight against terrorism by meeting agreed time periods for retention of
communications data that may be extended beyond those periods for
which their individual company currently retains data for business purposes." 53 Specifically, the "Code of Practice is intended to ensure that
communication service providers may retain data ... after the need for
retention for business purposes has elapsed and there is otherwise an
54
obligation to erase or anonymise retained data."
The paper states that "the usefulness of different types of communications data for the purpose of safeguarding national security will vary
and this is reflected in the different retention periods." 55 The retention
periods are: twelve months for subscriber information as well as telephony data, six months for SMS, EMS and MMS data, six months for email data, six months for ISP data, and four days for web activity logs. 56
For other services, such as instant message type services (log-on/off time)
and collateral data, the retention is relative to the service provided and
49. Id. at 3 $ 1.5.
50. Id. at 15 [ 12.4.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 15 $ 12.7.
53. See U.K. Home Office, Consultation Paper on a Code of Practicefor Voluntary Retention of Communications Data: Draft Code of Practice, 20,
1, http://www.homeoffice.
gov.uk/docs/ volretention.pdf.
54. Id. at 20, I3.
55. Id. at 23, 18.
56. U.K. Home Office, ConsultationPaper on a Code of Practicefor Voluntary Retention of Communications Data: Draft Code of Practice:Appendix A, 26-27, http://www.home
office.gov.uk/ docs/vol-retention.pdf.
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to data to which it is related.5 7 The Government argues that the data
categories and retention periods have been determined with regard to
considerations of necessity and proportionality. 58 The retention specification "has been drafted taking into account a number of factors, including Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights."5 9 The
Secretary of State considers the retention periods set out to be both necessary and proportionate in light of the individual's right to respect for
private life and the national security purposes for which the retention of
60
data is required.
On the costs arrangements, the consultation paper suggests that:
Where the period of retention of data for national security purposes is
not substantiallylonger than the period of retention for business purposes, the retention costs will continue to be borne by the communication service providers. Where data retention periods are significantly
longer for national security purposes than for business purposes, the
Secretary of State will contribute a reasonable proportion of the marginal cost as appropriate. Marginal costs may include, for example, the
design and production of additional storage and searching facilities.
This may be in the form of capital investment into retention and re61
trieval equipment or may include running costs.
In its regulatory impact assessment, the Government has given assurances that measures taken in the context of the emergency legislation
should not commercially disadvantage UK business or impact on the confidence of users and operators in the UK as the best place to do e-business. The details of the requirements will be covered in the code of
practice. 6 2 The questions are whether the provision of the Code of Practice contains the details as promised and how to interpret both the words
'substantially' and 'significantly' mentioned in the Code.
In the twelve-week consultation period, a total of fifty-seven replies
have been received by the Home Office which concludes, "The consultation paper provoked a lively debate about data retention across a broad
spectrum of interested parties and reconfirmed industry's commitment
to helping the government achieve its aims in the fight against terrorism." 63 Some have criticized the consultation itself. Ian Brown of the
FIPR, skeptical about the process, argued that:
57. Id. at 27.
58. Draft Code of Practice at 21,
11.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 23,
23-24 (emphasis added).
62. See U.K. Home Office, Consultation Paper on a Code of Practicefor Voluntary Retention of Communications Data, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/vol-retention.pdf (accessed July 28, 2004).
63. U.K. Home Office, Consultation Paper on a Code of Practice for Voluntary Retention of Communications Data (underthe Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001): Re-
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The data retention consultation is a sham.... The Home Office has
failed to address any of the well-known substantive issues and is merely
going through the motions so it can come back with a compulsory
scheme. The compulsory scheme is also likely to be unlawful and will be
incredibly expensive. The Home Office needs to drop data retention and
start again, perhaps with a targeted preservation scheme such as seems
64
to be successful in the USA.
On the questions of the appropriateness and proportionality of the code,
many of those responding indicated that they did not feel the threat to
national security was a subject on which they had sufficient knowledge
to enable them to judge the extent of the proposals. Of the replies received, 34 commented on this issue and, of those, 25 believed that,
based on the information available, the approach was not appropriate
or proportionate. The validity of data retention under the Code, in relation to data protection legislation, provoked comment from 27 respondents. Of those, 22 believed that the regime would be inappropriate....
Two-thirds of those who contributed to the consultation process expressed a view on the need for a retention regime. Of these, 22 were
against the concept of retention, while 14 favored such a regime ....
Of
the total responses 26 contained comment on the retention timescales
proposed in the Code. Nineteen of these indicated that the periods iden65
tified were not reasonable.
Liberty, "one of the UK's leading civil liberties and human rights
organizations," 6 6 objected fundamentally, "as a matter of principle[,] to
any approach to protection of national security or prevention of crime
that [involved] the creation of a pool of personal data [on] millions of
innocent people." 6 7 According to the Liberty, nothing in Section 102 of
the ATCSA suggests that Parliament contemplated a step that allows
the creation of a pool of retained data about large numbers of people
against whom there is not the faintest suspicion of unlawful activity with
a view to its being made available to the state. 68 The Liberty further
argued:
sponse to the Consultation Paper, 17, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs2/volretention_
comms data.html (Sept. 11, 2003).
64. See ZDNet UK, Matt Loney, Government's data retention back-pedal fails to im-

press, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,39020369,2131747,00.htm
2004).

(accessed Apr. 29,

65. ConsultationPaper on a Code of Practicefor Voluntary Retention of Communica-

tions Data, supra n. 63, at

5-6, 10-11.

66. Liberty, Liberty Response to the Home Office Consultation: 'A Code of Practice for
Voluntary Retention of Communications Data,' 2, http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/

resources/policy-papers/policy-papers-2003/pdf-documents/vol-retention-of-comms-data.pdf
(June 2003).
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at IT 5-6.
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Even if potentially authorized by the Act, the "data pool" approach
would be neither legally nor politically defensible unless supported by
the most compelling justification. The mere possibility that information
about citizens' prima facie lawful activity will be of future interest to
the police or security services is far too contingent to provide justification for the blanket adoption of periods of retention that substantially
exceed those mutually contemplated by the provider and user of communications services. Such an approach cannot
be reconciled with the
69
principles of necessity and proportionality.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights of the House of Lords and the
House of Commons, which examined the Draft Code, has raised four
matters of concern on human rights grounds. 70 First, if the communications providers which retain communications data "are not 'public authorities' for the purposes of the Human rights Act 1998, then they are
not directly subject to the legal obligations imposed by Section 6 of that
Act to act compatibly with Convention rights. It is therefore unclear how
the Draft Code would ensure that the state could discharge its obligations under the ECHR Article 8 in relation to the retention and storage
of the data."7 1 Second, "it is not clear how the Draft Code's standard
periods of retention would meet the requirement of proportionality which
form part of the test of necessity" under Article 8 of the ECHR. 72 Third,
"the availability of the communications data to agencies for purposes
other than the protection of national security would call in the question
the legitimacy of the aim for which the data are to be retained, [as well
as] the necessity for that retention and its proportionality."7 3 Fourth, "it
is not clear how thoroughly the consultation exercise ...was carried out
and how far the fruits of it have been taken into account in the Draft
74
Code."
The Committee noted that:
Any invasion of the right must be strongly justified. Safeguards are essential. Making those who retain communications data subject to the
Human Rights Act might be one such safeguard. Unless the primary
legislation is amended to provide expressly that the providers are, are
not, public authorities for that purpose, only the courts can answer the
69. Id. at

7.

70. House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Draft
Voluntary Code of Practiceon Retention of CommunicationsData under Part 11 of the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Sixteen Report of Session 2002-03, 7, http:fl
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pajt2002O3/jtselect/jtrights/181/18l.pdf (Nov.
11, 2003). The Committee was disappointed that the Home Office did not explicitly seek its
views before laying the draft order bringing the Draft Code into effect. See id. at 6.
71. Id. at 7, 7(a).
72. Id. at 7, 7(b).
73. Id. at 7,
7(c).
74. Id. at 7, T 7(d).
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question authoritatively.

75

The Committee noted that "if the Government's view is correct, it increases the importance of ensuring that the provisions of the Code, under
which the communications providers will work, are fully compatible with
Convention rights, particularly ECHR Article 8."76
On the second issue, the Joint Committee recognized that the state
has an obligation to ensure that the blanket retention of communications
data is necessary for a legitimate purpose, and that it is proportionate to
the aim which it seeks to achieve. 77 "In the context of communications
data, appropriate safeguards might also include legislation [that imposes] on service providers an obligation to ensure that an assessment of
proportionality is made in relation to different pieces of data."78 According to the Committee, "neither the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act 2000, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and security Act 2001 nor the Draft
Code indicates that there is a requirement of proportionality, let alone
offers advice on how it should be applied." 79 The Committee remarked:
We agree that Parliament accepted that there may be a need for data
retention for those purposes.. .However, we have not been able to establish how pressing the needs is, or how often the police and security and
intelligence services find it necessary to make use of such data or are
significantly hampered by its absence. Those matters seem to us to be
relevant to the assessment, to be made by each House, of the necessity
for the retention which would be sought by the Draft Code, and of the
proportionality of the periods set for retention of each kind of communi80
cations data.
Regarding the use of retained data for purposes unrelated to national security, the Joint Committee is "prepared to accept the Government's view that, as a matter of policy, it should be possible to have
access to any communications data which are available and relevant to a
case if the conditions are satisfied on the facts of the particular case." 8 1
The Committee has come to the conclusion that the safeguards, 8 2 cou75. House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, at 8, [
12, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt2002O3/jtselect/jtrights/181/
181.pdf.
76. Id. The Government takes the view that the retention of communications data by
communications providers is "a private function that arises out of the commercial service
that the communication services providers provide." Id. at 19.
77. Id. at 8-9, 12.
78. Id. at 9, 16.
79. Id. at 9, 16.
80. Id. at 10, 19.
81. House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, at 12,
25, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt2002O3/jtselect/jtrights/18V/
181.pdf.
82. The safeguards are: (1) any access will have to be authorized or required by a designated person in a public authority empowered to access such data by the RIPA, (2) the
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pled with the availability of judicial review of a notice or authorization
under the RIPA and the need to comply with the Data Protection Principles under the Data Protection Act 1998, "are capable[,] in principle[,] of
providing appropriate protection for the right to respect for private life
"s 3
and correspondence under ECHR Article 8.
On the consultation process, the Committee "asked the Government
what views the Information Commissioner expressed when consulted on
the Draft Code and what steps were taken to consult with the communications service providers."8 4 The Committee is satisfied that the steps
taken were "sufficient to comply with the Secretary of State's duty under
section 103(2) of [the ATCSA] to consult the communications providers to
85
whom the Draft Code will apply."
The Joint Committee in its conclusion explicitly noted that they
are very concerned that the communications providers who will be retaining communications data under the provisions of Part 11 of the
ATCSA, often for long periods, as a matter of course will not... be functional public authorities for the purposes of the Human rights Act 1998,
and so will not be subject to any of the obligations arising under ECHR
Article 8.86
As already mentioned, the Committee is of the view that this "makes it
particularly important to ensure that the Draft Code, and the standard
periods of retention which it contains, are necessary for a legitimate aim
and are proportionate to the objective sought to be achieved."8 7 The Committee regrets that "more time has not been allowed to permit Parliament to consider more fully these far-reaching proposals."8 8 The
Committee noted, "[t]he Home Secretary has convinced us that making
communications data accessible is likely to be useful investigative tool,
but we are not able to say that we are satisfied that the arrangements in
89
the Draft Code would be proportionate to legitimate objectives."
designated person will be a public authority, bound by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
Convention rights, (3) the designated person will also be bound to refuse a notice or
authorisation unless he or she believes that the requirements of necessity and proportionality are met on the facts of each particular case under section 22(1) and (5) of the RIPA, (4)
the availability of judicial review of a notice or authorisation under the RIPA, and (5) the
need to comply with the Data Protection Principles under the Data Protection Act 1998.
83. House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, at 12,
25, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt2002O3/jtselect/jtrights/18V/
181.pdf.
84. Id. at 12, 27.
85. Id. at 13, 28.
86. Id. at 14, 31.
87. Id.
88. House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, at 14,
33, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt2002O3/jtselect/jtrights/18V1
181.pdf.
89. Id at 14, $ 31.
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DATA RETENTION UNDER HEAVY CRITICISM

From the government's perspective, according to Marco Cappoto, a
radical MEP and long term civil liberties campaigner, "it should be easy
for the Council to find agreement on a common framework decision on
data retention once the 'technicalities' can be arranged." 90 He stated,
Of the governments surveyed, Denmark 'can support' a European instrument. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, the UK
and Sweden warmly support the idea. The only countries expressing
some uncertainties are Austria and Germany. The German authorities
say that they need proof that the European instrument is compatible
91
with the German constitutional law.
The Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), however,
predicts that the implementation phase of the data retention provision
may become bumpy in many EU countries. 92 "While a few countries
have already established data retention schemes (e.g. Belgium, France,
Spain, and the United Kingdom), the implementation phase of the Directive's data retention provision" may not be smooth in other Member
States principally because the Directive could be considered as being in
conflict with the constitutions of some EU countries 93 with respect to
fundamental rights, such as the presumption of innocence, right to privacy, confidentiality of communications and freedom of expression. 9 4
The principle of data retention still faces strong criticism from many
parties. It has been argued that, although the data retention provision
of the new Directive is supposed to constitute an exception to the general
regime of data protection established by the Directive:
[Tihe ability of the governments to compel ISPs and telecommunications companies to store all data about all of their subscribers can
hardly be construed as an exception to be narrowly interpreted. The
practical result is that all users of new communication technologies (the
Internet, e-mail, mobile phones, etc.) are now considered worthy of scrutiny and surveillance in a generalized and preventive fashion for periods of time that states' legislatures or governments have discretion to
95
determine.
90. The Register, John Leyden, Germany, Austria take stand against EU ISP data re-

tention laws, http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/28228.html (Nov. 21, 2002).
91. Id.

92. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Data Retention, http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/data retention.html (last updated Mar. 25, 2004).
93. The Austrian Federal Constitutional Court held on Feb. 27, 2003 that the statute
that compelled telecommunication service providers to implement wiretapping measures at
their own expense is unconstitutional.
94. Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/data-retention.html.
95. Id.
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The "Global Internet Liberty Campaign ("GILC"), a coalition of 60
civil liberties groups, [that] organized a campaign against data retention" during the debate of the Directive, argues that "data retention... is
contrary to well-established international human rights conventions and
case law." 96 The "Data Protection Commissioners in the EU and their
officials, who attended a multitude of working parties, have long been
aware" of the data retention initiative. 97 The spring conference of European Data Protection Commissioners in Stockholm, April 6-7, 2000, issued a declaration on the 'Retention of Traffic Data by Internet Service
Providers,' stating:
Such retention would be an improper invasion of the fundamental
rights guaranteed to individuals by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Where traffic data are to be retained in specific
cases, there must be demonstrable need, the period of retention must be
98
as short as possible and the practice must be clearly regulated by law.
Again, on September 11, 2002, during the international conference
of data protection commissioners in Cardiff, the European Data Protection Commissioner released a declaration that strongly warned against
any future EU-wide mandatory and systematic data retention scheme.
The Commissioners expressed "grave doubt as to the legitimacy and legality of such broad measures." 9 9
The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") based its criticisms
on consumers' privacy concern and confidence, as well as the unreasonable cost and technical burdens on the telcoms and ISPs.10 0 According to
the ICC, "public concern about the privacy of communications and activities on the Internet has been widely expressed in the context of proposals
for mandatory traffic data retention, and it is unlikely to diminish as
more countries consider legislation." 1 1 The ICC also questioned the
need for the data retention regime as the data kept for billing purpose
can be used by the law enforcement agencies.' 0 2 The ICC assures governments of the world:
96. Id.
97. Statewatch, EU Governments to Give Law Enforcement Agencies Access to All Communications Data, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/may/03Benfopol.htm (accessed
Apr. 29, 2004).
98. Id.
99. See Foundation for Information Policy Research, Statement of the European Data
ProtectionCommissioners at the InternationalConference in Cardiff(9-11 September 2002)
on mandatory systematic retention of telecommunication traffic data, http://www.fipr.org/
press/020911DataCommissioners.html (accessed Oct. 29, 2004).
100. See ICC, "Don'tPlay Big Brother"is Business Plea to Governments on Internet Traffic, http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news-archives/2002/stories/big-brother.asp
(Nov. 29,
2002).

101. Id.
102. Id.
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Business is as determined as anybody to fight crime and terrorism. But
we are convinced that law enforcement agencies can get all the information they need from traffic data already kept by business for billing purposes without impairing public
confidence in Internet services through
10 3
Orwellian intrusiveness.
The ICC has issued a policy statement to warn governments against
the emerging traffic data retention laws.' 0 4 It recommends that governments should favor "targeted data preservation over data retention regimes."105 Other recommendations include:
" Data retention must be justified, proportionate and necessary for the
purposes of investigating and prosecuting terrorism and other criminal activity only. The types and time period of data to be retained
should be kept to an absolute minimum.
" Access to traffic data should be limited to law enforcement agencies
on production of a warrant or similar instrument.
* Governments should bear the infrastructure costs of mandatory data
retention regimes.
" Transparent and effective oversight procedures are necessary to pre10 6
vent abuses and safeguard consumer confidence.
The ICC concludes:
Any traffic data storage requirements imposed by governments should
be focused, narrow, publicly funded, limited to the measures absolutely
necessary to protect society, and balances the interests of government,
10° 7
business and users
The European Internet Services Providers Association ("EuroISPA")
and the US Internet Service Provider Association ("USISPA")
Urge all governments to undertake a serious cost benefit analysis of the
impact of applying mandatory data retention requirements before moving forward in this area. This should be accompanied by equally serious
analysis and comparison of alternative regulatory approaches, in particular, that of 'data preservation'. The ISP industry is convinced that the
later approach, in conjunction with appropriate use of data managed by
ISPs for the security of their services, is the right and only way
forward. 108
The EuroISPA and USISPA argue that:
Mandatory data retention is an extreme step. Governments have not
sufficiently demonstrated that the absence of mandatory data retention
103. Id.
104. ICC, Policy Statement: Storage of Traffic Data for Law Enforcement Purposes,
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/e-business/policy/373-22-106E.pdf (Nov. 18, 2002).
105. Id. at 1.
106. Id. at 2, 4, 5.
107. Id. at 6.
108. EUROISPA and US ISPA Position on the Impact of Data Retention Laws on the
Fight Against Cybercrime, 1, http://www.euroispa.org/docs/020930eurousispa-dretent.pdf
(Sept. 30, 2002).
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is detrimental to the public interests. In countries like the United
States, where there is no mandatory data retention, the law enforcement agencies routinely obtain the evidence they need. The US law enforcement has also endorsed data preservationas workable solution. 109
Data retention, according to these organizations, "would be a major blow
to the current European legal framework on data protection. [The] industry is extremely concerned that the issue of privacy seems to be raised
mainly when discussing the duration of retention and not its scope." 1 10
According to the EuroISPA and USISPA, "Mandatory Data Retention by ISPs - for which there is no business purpose - would impose
serious technical, legal and financial burdens on ISPs." 1 11 It will "put
much personal information at risk of accidental disclosure or intentional
misuse," and "data preservation is a significantly less radical and currently available solution" for evidence-gathering tool. 11 2 The EuroISPA
and USISPA assert:
ISPs find that there is no compelling or convincing evidence of greater
efficiency benefits for law enforcement with the data retention approach .... Mandatory data retention is a drastic step that should not
be taken unless drastic alternatives have been tested and proven
inadequate. 113
The All Party Internet Group ("APIG") conducted an "inquiry into all
aspects of communications data retention and the subsequent access to
that data from a UK, European and global perspective. The inquiry [primarily focuses] on the enforcement of the powers contained in the [RIPA]
and the [ATCSA] and their subsequent effect on communications service
providers."11 4 In January 2003, APIG published a crucial document,
Communications Data: Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Internet
Group.115 The report states, "in some people's view, Parliament was mistaken and the retention of communications data, even for reasons of national security, is not proportionate and therefore not 'human rights
compliant.""'1 6 The APIG argues:
In view of the clear evidence presented to us of its inevitable failure, we
can see nothing to be gained from the spectacle of seeing a voluntary
scheme proposed, approved by Parliament and then being ignored by
the communications service providers. We can reach no other conclu109. Id. (emphasis original).
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1, 3.
114. All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, Communications Data: Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group, 34, http://www.apig.org.uk/APIGreport.pdf (Jan.
2003).
115. All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, http://www.apig.org.uk/APIGreport.pdf.
116. Id. at 20, 134.
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sion than to recommend that the Home Office immediately drop their
plans to introduce a voluntary scheme for data retention under
ATCSA.117
Mandatory data retention scheme, according to the APIG, "will do
immense harm to the [CSP] industry and will not actually achieve the
results wished for by Law Enforcement."' 18 The APIG does not believe
that it is practical "to retain all communications data on the off chance
that it will be useful one day." 11 9 It recommends very strongly for the
Government not to invoke their powers under Section 104 of the ATCSA
and impose a mandatory data retention scheme. 120 Instead, the Home
Office should "enter into a dialogue with the CSP industry to develop an
appropriate data preservation scheme to meet the needs of Law Enforcement."12 1 The APIG believes "that the moves in other EU states towards
a data retention policy are entirely mistaken. In particular, ...
["S]addling the entire European communications service providers industry with costs that do not have to be incurred by their American competitors will cause immense damage." 12 2 The APIG urgently
recommends that the Government "enter into Europe-wide discussion to
dismantle data retention regimes and to ensure that data preservation
12 3
becomes EU policy."
The FIPR believes that the creation of warehouses of communications data will lead to significant abuses of the individual's rights. 12 4 The
FIPR argues that "it is predictable that excuses will be found to trawl
through them looking for patterns of behavior or patterns of association.
Such warehouses are exactly the tools needed to create a totalitarian
125
state, and it is foolish in the extreme to create them."
VI.

BALANCING THE COMPETING COMMUNITY INTERESTS

The Home Office, in recognizing the relationship between privacy
and freedom, states "We value our privacy. We value our freedom. In the
same way our freedom is balanced against society's rules, our privacy
has to be balanced against the needs of society for preventing and de117. Id. at 22,

141.

118. Id. at 27,

177.

119. Id.
120. All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, at 27, 178, http://www.apig.org.uk/
APIGreport.pdf.
121. Id. at 28, 186.
122. Id. at 29, 189.
123. Id.
124. See FIPR's comments submitted to the APIG inquiry, 2, http://www.apig.org.uk/
fipr.pdf (accessed Oct. 29, 2004).
125. Id.
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tecting crime." 126 On the other hand, in achieving the twin objectives of
enhancing privacy and making better use of personal data to deliver
smarter public services, the Government insists that it will opt for the
least intrusive approach. 12 7 This means that where it "can achieve improvements in services or efficiency without requiring more information
and affecting personal privacy, it should do so." 12 8 The Government
pledges that it will consider alternative approaches that have a lesser
impact on privacy in achieving the objectives. 129 After all, the protection
of privacy, according to the Government, is in and of itself a public service. 130 As argued by many, data preservation being the least intrusive
is the option.
"The tragic terrorist attacks against the United States have highlighted the necessity for democratic societies to engage in the fight
against terrorism. This objective is both a necessary and valuable element of democratic societies. In this fight, certain conditions have to be
respected which also form part of the basis of the democratic societies." 13 1 "Measures against terrorism should not and need not reduce
standards of protection of fundamental rights which characterizes democratic societies. A key element of the fight against terrorism involves
ensuring the preservation of these fundamental values that are the basis
of the democratic societies and the very values that those advocating the
use of violence seek to destroy."1 3 2 "There is an increasing tendency to
represent the protection of personal data as a barrier to the efficient
133
fight against terrorism."
As stated by the EU Working Party, "terrorism is not a new phenomenon and cannot be qualified as a temporary phenomenon."1 34 And legislation is not the only weapon in the counter-terrorism armory, nor is it
the most important. Lord Lloyd of Berwick in his report, Inquiry Into
Legislation Against Terrorism, stated that the primary function of the
law in this area is to support policies and activities which tackle the
126. Home Office, Access to CommunicationData:Respecting Privacyand Protectingthe
Public from Crime, A Consultation Paper http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/consult.pdf
(Mar. 2003).
127. Cabinet Office, Privacy and Data-sharing:The Way Forward for Public Services,
Apr. 8, 2002 (available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/su/privacy/downloads/piu-data.pdf
(accessed July 29, 2004)).
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Article 29 - Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2001: On the Need for a
Balanced Approach in the Fight Against Terrorism, 2 (Dec. 14, 2001) (available at http://
www.statewatch.org/ news/2002/janlwp53en.pdf (accessed Nov. 1, 2004)).
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 3.
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menace of terrorism directly. The first, and overriding, response to terrorism is the political. 13 5 According to the report, some terrorist campaigns may ultimately be brought to an end only by political means,
backed as necessary by security measures.1 3 6 Other forms of terrorism
must simply be suppressed - there is no practical alternative. 137 And
since terrorist violence presents a direct challenge to the government's
primary responsibility to ensure public safety, fighting terrorism is, it138
self, a political activity.
Lord Lloyd has formulated four general principles that should govern any code of laws designed to counter violent subversion. First, legislation against terrorism should approximate as closely as possible to the
ordinary criminal law and procedure. 139 Second, additional statutory offences and powers may be justified but only if they are necessary to meet
the anticipated threat. 40 They must then strike the right balance between the needs of security and the rights and liberties of the individual. 14 1 Third, the need for additional safeguards should be considered
alongside any additional powers, and fourth, the law should comply with
142
the UK's obligations under international law.
In considering data retention measures, regard must be had to the
fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the
individual and of the community as a whole. In Hatton v. U.K, 1 43 the
applicants complained that the failure of the United Kingdom authorities to prevent night flights which disturbed their sleep during take-off
and landing at Heathrow airport amounted to a violation of their right to
respect for private and family life.' 4 4 In striking the required balance,
the Court held that the states must have regard to the whole range of
material considerations:
States are required to minimize, as far as possible, the interference
with these rights, by trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in the least onerous way as regards
human rights. In order to do that, a proper and complete investigation
and study with the aim of finding the best possible solution, which will,
135. Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry Into Legislation Against Terrorism, vol. 1,
no. 7 (1996).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry Into Legislation Against Terrorism, vol. 1,
no. 7.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 9.
143. [2001] European Ct. of Human Rights 36022/97 (Oct. 2, 2001) (available at [2001]
ECHR 36022/97).
144. Id.
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in reality,
strike the right balance should precede the relevant
45
project.1
Applying this test to all aspects of respect for private life (and not
just in the field of environmental protection), it can be argued that the
question of whether the state has carried out a thorough review of the
laws concerning the protection of national security, as well as the prevention and detection of crime, before venturing into data retention is
very relevant. The question of whether any alternative means are available which would minimize any interference with the rights of Article 8 is
also relevant.
It must be emphasized that the right balance that must be struck
here is not only between the competing interest of the individual against
the interest of the community, but, also the interest of the community as
a whole, to be protected against crime as well as against surveillance.
VII.

POSSIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGE

The EU network of independent experts in fundamental rights
("CRF-CDF") published a thematic comment, The Balance between Freedom and Security in the Response by the European Union and its Member States to the Terrorist Threat, on March 31, 2003.146 The report
states that the independent experts on fundamental rights are, in fact,
convinced that the effectiveness of steps to fight terrorism cannot be
measured by the extent of restrictions which these steps impose on fundamental freedoms. 14 7 In other words, the increase in security is not inversely proportional to the restriction of freedom; on the contrary,
certain practices minimize the scope of restrictions on fundamental
rights whilst offering a high level of effectiveness. 148 The report
concludes:
International law on human rights is not opposed to States taking measures to protect against terrorist threat. But as a counterpart to restrictions that the States adopt to respond to that threat, it must imagine
mechanisms by which the consequences for the guarantee of individual
freedoms are limited to a strict minimum. In particular, independent
control mechanisms must be provided that can counter possible abuse
by the Executive or the criminal prosecution authorities. In addition,
restrictions imposed on individual freedoms in response to the terrorist
threat must be limited to what is absolutely necessary. These restrictions were adopted to cope with an immediate threat, but one that is not
145. Id. at 97.
146. EU Network of Independence Experts in Fundamental Rights, The Balance Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the European Union and its Member states
to the Terrorist Threats (Mar. 31, 2003).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 10.
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necessarily permanent, and as such, they should be of a temporary
character and be assessed regularly under some kind of mechanism.
They should be targeted sufficiently precisely and not affect other phenomena or possibly other categories of persons, on the pretext of terror149
ist threat.
Article 15 of the Electronic Privacy Directive allows data retention
measures where "necessary, appropriate, and proportionate" within a
democratic society. 150 The Directive sensibly and prudently only permitted retention measures if these conditions could be satisfied within a
democratic society. The unrestricted, blanket data retention is expressly
rejected. Furthermore, the Member States may take legislative measures providing for data retention only if is necessary, appropriate, and
proportionate. 15 1 It is imperative for the government to demonstrate
that data retention satisfy those requirements. This means that proper
assessments of the necessity, appropriateness, and proportionality of the
data retention legislative measures have to be carried out. There is also a
need to assess whether less intrusive and less costly measures, such as
data preservation, might effectively achieve what the data retention re52
gime seeks to achieve.'
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR")
encompasses the right to be oneself, to live as oneself and to keep to oneself.' 5 3 In the leading case of Niemitz v. Germany,'5 4 the court pronounced that respect for private life must also comprise, to a certain
degree, the right to establish and develop relationships with other
human beings. The Court in Z v. Finland155 has asserted that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance of a person's enjoy149. Id. at 52.
150. Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002/58/EC at Art. 15. (July

12, 2002).
151. Id.
152. The current practice in Europe is that communication operators work closely with
law enforcement agencies, police forces, and other national agencies. This cooperation includes real-time interception of communications and the preservation and disclosure of
communications data that is routinely collected for legitimate business purposes. Indeed,
the efforts of industry to assist with criminal and anti-terrorist investigations since September 11, 2001 have been praised by many EU governments. The current cooperation
between law enforcement and industry has proven effective. There have been very few occasions when communications service providers have been unable to satisfy a request to
disclose data because the data had already been deleted. If the current cooperation between
law enforcement and industry has been and is effective, then it is even more imperative to
demonstrate the application of the directive data storage provision be proportionate, necessary, and justified. See American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union, "Position
Paperon Data Retention in the EU," (June 4, 2003).

153. Lord Lester of Herne Hill & David Pannick, Human Rights: Law and Practice
(1999).
154. 16 European Human Rights Rep., $ 29 (1992).
155. 25 European Human Rights Rep. 371, $195 (1998).
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ment of his or her right to respect for privacy and family life under
Article 8.
As already mentioned, many argue that the UK's data retention regimes constitute an interference with the right to respect for private life
and correspondence enshrined in Article 8. The Government seems to
admit this. 156 Relying on Article 8(2), the Government, interestingly, argues that communications data retention will be in accordance with the
[ECHR,] provided that the retention periods are proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued. 157 The Government also argues that in the
ATCSA, "Parliament concluded that the retention of communications
data was necessary for the purposes set out," and the "draft Code of Practice sets out the retention periods for different types of communications
data that the Secretary of State considers proportionate. 'u1Ss Simply, the
Government sees proportionality in the context of retention periods. Perhaps, the real issue is not so much on the retention periods, but whether
the legal regimes allowing the retention and the act of retention itself are
proportionate with the aims being pursued. As stated by the European
Commissioners for data protection: "Systematic retention of all kinds of
traffic data for a period of one year or more would be clearly disproportionate and therefore unacceptable in any case."' 5 9
Article 8(2) acknowledges that interference by the State is justified
provided it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society. 1 60 Article 8(2) has been given a narrow interpretation. 161 The
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Klass v. Fed. Republic of
Germany16 2 stated that "powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterizing as they do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention
only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic
16 3
institutions."
'In accordance with the law' means that the state must be able to
show that its conduct must have some basis in domestic law whether by
156. The Government states that the retention of communications data by communications service providers in accordance with the Code beyond the periods that they would
otherwise hold it for business purposes may engage the rights under Article 8 of the ECHR;
See Consultation Paperon a Code of Practice for Voluntary Retention of Communications
Data,supra n. 47 at 9, I 7.7.
157. Id. at 10, 7.7 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 10,
7.8.
159. Foundation for Information Policy Research, supra n. 102.
160. Privacy International, Memorandum of Laws Concerning the Legality of Data Retention with regard to the Rights Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human
Rights, 8, http://www.privacyinternational.orgissues/terrorism/rpt/data-retention-memo.
pdf (Oct. 10, 2003).
161. Id.
162. 2 European Human Rights Rep. 214 (1979).
163. Id. at 231.
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statute or by common law.16 4 It might be argued that although the
ATCSA provides a framework for a code of practice and/or agreement,
and requires any code to be brought into force by statutory instrument, it
may fail to meet this requirement of being 'in accordance with law' because of its voluntary nature.
'In accordance with law' does not merely refer to the existence of
domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be
compatible with the rule of law. 16 5 The Court in the case of Amann v.
Switzerland16 6 reiterated this requirement of quality of law and held
that the legal basis must be accessible and foreseeable. "The principle
behind the foreseeability requirement is the simple notion that the State
should give citizens an adequate indication of the circumstances in
which public authorities are empowered to interfere in their private
lives."1 6 7 Thus, "individuals can regulate their conduct accordingly.., to

168
avoid invoking unwelcome intrusions by the State."
The requirement of foreseeability is not satisfied by blanket regulations, such as those envisaged in the [Draft Code], that allow everyone
to foresee that the State will interfere with their right to a private life.
As the Court said in respect of secret surveillance in Malone v. United
Kingdom 'it would be "contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion
granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered
power."' What makes a law foreseeable is the extent to which it distinguishes between different classes of people, thereby placing a limit on
arbitrary enforcement by the authorities. Thus, in Kruslin v. France,
the Court found that a law authorizing telephone tapping lacked the
requisite foreseeability because it nowhere defined the categories of
people liable to have their telephones tapped or the nature of the offences which might justify such surveillance. In Amman v. Switzerland,
the Court reached the same conclusion with regard to a decree permitting the police to conduct surveillance because the decree gave no indication of the persons subject to surveillance or the circumstances in
which it could be ordered. Data retention laws that fail to distinguish
between different classes of people would have a more pernicious impact on individual privacy than the vague laws at issue in Kruslin and
69
Amann.1
"Blanket data retention laws also offend the principle of foreseeability because they make no distinction for relationships the State already
170
recognizes as sufficiently special to warrant a degree of protection."

164. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 European Human Rights Rep. 347 (1983); Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom, 2 European Human Rights Rep. 245 (1979).
165. Privacy International, supra n. 165.
166. 30 European Human Rights Rep. 843 (2000).
167. Privacy International, supra, n. 165, at 8.
168. Id.
169. Privacy International, supra n. 165 at 8-9 (internal citations omitted).
170. Id. at 9.
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The Court in Kopp v. Switzerland' 7 ' held "that the telephone tapping
law failed to meet the standard of foreseeability because it provided no
guidance on how authorities should distinguish between protected and
unprotected attorney-client communications." 17 2 The data retention regulations suffer from the same flaw.
Article 8(2) allows interference. However, it must be for a legitimate
aim and necessary in a democratic society. 173 The test of necessity involves deciding whether there is a "pressing social need" for the interference and whether the means employed are "proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued by the State." 174 In conducting such an examination, it is the nature, context and importance of the right asserted and
the extent of interference that must be balanced against the nature, context and importance of the public interest asserted as justification.
As the Court mentioned in Hatton, states are required to minimize,
as much as possible, the interference with the Article 8(2)'s rights by
trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve
their aims in the least onerous way. Privacy International argues that
"Article 8(2)'s limited exception requires that any interference be no
greater than is necessary in a democratic society." 175 For a measure "to
be proportional, the State must put in place safeguards ensuring that
1 76
interference with those rights is no greater than necessary."
Mandatory data retention laws, according to the Privacy International,
1 77
"fail on this score as well."
The Government argues that proportionality depends on assessment
of three things: "degree of intrusion into an individual's private life involved; strength of public policy justification; [and the] adequacy of the
safeguards in place to prevent abuse." 1 78 The Government should be reminded of its own Guidance, jointly produced with the Bar Council. The
proportionality test is defined as follows:
Even if a particular policy or action, which interferes with the Convention right, pursues a legitimate aim (such as the prevention of crime)
this will not justify the interference if the means used to achieve the
aim are excessive in the circumstances. Any interference with a Con171. 27 EHRR 91 (1998).
172. Privacy International, supra n. 165 at 9.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 9-10.
175. Id. at 9.
176. Id. at 10.
177. Privacy International, Memorandum of Laws Concerning the Legality of Data Retention with regard to the Rights Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human
Rights, 10, http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/rpt/data-retention-memo.
pdf.
178. Consultation Paper on a Code of Practice for Voluntary Retention of Communications Data, supra n. 47, at 10,
7.7.
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vention right should be carefully designed to meet the objective in question and must not be arbitrary or unfair. Public authorities must not
use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Even taking all these considerations into account, interference in a particular case may still not be justified because the impact on the individual or group is just too
severe. 179
Simply, the means must not be arbitrary or unfair and excessive in
the circumstances. The impact on the individual or group must not be too
severe. It can be argued that the data retention measures, which involve
the generalized and systematic surveillance of electronic communications of all users, can be arbitrary, unfair and excessive. It is also disproportionate. The impact on society is also too severe because the states
can now lawfully require blanket surveillance of the electronic communication of the entire population. Arguably, the data retention regime may
not be able to survive the proportionality test.
The Court in Kopp held unanimously that there had been a violation
of Article 8.180 The concurring opinion of Judge Pettiti deserves
attention:
It is regrettable fact that state, para-state and private bodies are making increasing use of the interception of telephone and other communication for various purposes. In Europe so-called administrative
telephone monitoring is not generally subject to an adequate system or
level of protection ....
The European Court has clearly laid down in its
case law the requirement of supervision by the judicial authorities in a
democratic society, which is characterized by the rule of law, with the
attendant guarantees of independence and impartiality; this is all the
more important in order to meet the threat posed by new technologies. . . . Where monitoring is ordered by a judicial authority, even
where there is valid basis in law, it must be used for a specific purpose,
not as a general 'fishing' exercise to bring in information.... The legislation of numerous European states fails to comply with Article 8 of the
Convention where the telephone tapping is concerned. States use - or
abuse - the concepts of official secrets and secrecy in the interests of
national security, where necessary, they distort the meaning and nature of that term. Some clarification of what these concepts mean is
needed in order to refine and improve the system for the prevention of
terrorism. 181
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

The road ahead seems to be difficult for the retention of communications data. The resistance against it started as soon as the Directive was
179. The Human Rights Act 1998: Study Guide, at T 3.8-9.
180. Kopp v. Switzerland, [1998] European Ct. of Human Rights 23224/94 (Mar. 25,
1998).
181. Id. (Pettiti, J., concurring).
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initiated. The GILC managed to collect 16,000 signatures against it in
only a matter of days. The resistance has, overwhelmingly, been growing
since then. The criticisms from many different groups and the reasons
are various and numerous. This shows that data retention is, indeed, a
critical and delicate issue. It affects and impacts, significantly, directly
or indirectly, individuals, society as a whole, industry and e-commerce.
Data retention legal regimes may be contested as contravening the fundamental rights under Article 8(1) of the ECHR and it may not be justified under Article 8(2). Obviously, and logically, all these views,
comments and findings are too important to be ignored by the governments in the EU and elsewhere.
It is all about striking the balance between the right of society to be
protected from crime and terrorism against the right of society and the
entire population to privacy and to be free from constant surveillance. In
this respect, it is even arguable whether Article 8(2) can be relied upon
by the state to justify the data retention legislation.
The authorities may make a claim along the lines that 'only the
guilty have to fear' Perhaps, this is a misunderstanding of the meaning
of privacy. Privacy is about the right of individuals to go about their lawful activity without interference. Privacy is also the fundamental element for the activities on the Internet.1 8 2 Data retention will probably
undermine the use of the Internet and many might be migrating out of
cyberspace. As one commentator stated:
The negative impact of data retention is going to fall on the 95% of users
who are mainly honest while the 5% of the hardcore criminals are
clearly finding ways evading it. While most of the population is going to
have all their online actions potentially traced it will be trivial for
crooks to steal phone, hack into computers or a PBX, or use other techniques to protect their communications. At the same time, retention legislation will increase the cost of running the Internet related services,
penalize new technologies, criminalize providers or users who do not
wish to keep logs of everything, and seriously undermine the public's
83
perception of the Internet and information technologies as a whole.'
If the UK and Europe are to fulfill the Lisbon objectives of 'becoming
the most dynamic, competitive, knowledge based economy in the world',
the Internet and communications users must feel confident that their
privacy is both respected and protected.
182. E.g. World Summit on the Information Society, Declarationof Principles, 5, http:l!
(Dec. 12, 2003) (regarded
heiwww.unige.ch/-clapham/hrdoc/docs/worldinfodecl.pdf
strengthening the trust framework, which includes privacy, as a prerequisite for the development of the Information Society and for building confidence among user of ICTs).
183. George Danezis, Comments on the EU Cybercrime Forum: Technical Issues Around
Data Retention, http:lwww.cl.cam.ac.uk/-gd2l6/RetentionComments.pdf (accessed July
28, 2004).

